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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH and JOANN
LORRAINE CLARK,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
-vsMARK THOMAS CLARK,
CIVIL NOS.
Defendant and Respondent,
and

1^132, 14133, 1413^

STATE OF UTAH and SHARON 0. BOWEN,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
-vsKIM P. BOWEN,
Defendant and Respondent,
and
STATE OF UTAH and MARY 0. VIGIL,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
-vsALFONSO M. VIGIL,
Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiff-Appellants, State of Utah and three named women, Joann
L. Clark, Sharon 0. Bowen and Mary 0. Vigil, appeal from identical memorandum decisions rendered in the District Court of Weber County, State of
Utah, granting summary judgment of dismissal of their complaints under
the Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act, §§78-^5-1 et seq. U.C.A.
1953, as amended (hereinafter UCLSA).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellants brought separate actions in the District Court of
Weber County, the Honorable Calvin Gould, presiding, for reimbursement
of funds expended for the support of the three named woman Appellants,
suit having been brought under the UCLSA, §78-45-9 U.C.A. 1953 (pre-1975
amendment version.

All references to §78-45-9 herein are to the pre-

1975 amendment version of said section.)

All three cases were heard

together on defendants1 motions for summary judgment on the 30th day of
April, 1975.
After hearing arguments on said motions, the Court granted
summary judgment of dismissal to each of the three defendants.

Judge

Gould issued identical memorandum decisions in each case, holding that
plaintiffs could not recover under the UCLSA and would not be entitled
to a judgment for a sum certain without first obtaining an order for
monthly support against defendants.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondents seek affirmance of the memorandum decisions and
petition the Supreme Court to declare that for an order of support to
be obtained under the Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act, either
for prospective support or reimbursement for support already provided,
a hearing must first be conducted pursuant to the criteria of §78-45-7
U.C.A.1953, as amended.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondents agree substantially with the STATEMENT OF FACTS
in Appellants' Brief, except as hereinbelow indicated, and would make
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1iabi1ity for support exists only after a court has determined that
liability and, furthermore, that in proceedings under the UCLSA, the
determination of both prospective and retrospective support liability
must be made by the District Court pursuant to the criteria set out in
§78-45-7 U.C.A.
Liability for support, by which is meant judicial determination of the amount of support, should be based in part on the obligor's
(usually the father's) actual current ability to provide it.
case law is in agreement with this view.

Utah's

In Hulse v. Hulse, I I I Utah 193,

176 P.2d 875 0947), the Utah Supreme Court declared that, "the father of
a child has a legal duty to support his minor child, if he has the capacity
to do so." 176 P.2d 875 at 876 (emphasis added).

Among the other Utah

decisions supporting the Hulse view are Rockwood v. Rockwood, 65 Utah 261,
236 P.457 (1925); Cooke v. Cooke, 248 P.83 (Utah 1926); Anderson v.
Anderson, 110 Utah 300, 172 P.2d 132 (1946); and Ottley v. Hill , 21 Utah
2d 396, 446 P.2d 301 (1968).

In each of these cases the Utah Supreme

Court used slightly different wording, but conveyed the same principle,
i.e., that liability for support exists only where the father has the
ability to provide support.

Thus in Rockwood, supra, the standard for

determining liability to pay support was "if he [father] is able to do
so," 236 P.457 at 460; in Cooke, supra, support liability would be
imposed

if providing support was "within his [father's] means," 248 P.83

at 109; Ottley v. Hill, supra, would order the father to provide support
"if he is able to do so," 446 P.2d 301 at 302.
Anderson v. Anderson, supra, cited at pp.18-19 of Appellants'
Brief, is instructive.

In Anderson there was a variance between the
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findings and decree with respect to alimony and support money in a
divorce action.

After clarifying this variance, the Utah Supreme Court

held:
. . . The criterion for determination of support
money is the need of the persons supported and the
defendant's [father's] ability to pay. 172 P.2d
132 at 136.
The courts of other jurisdictions have adopted this view.

Thus,

in Commonwealth v. Testa, 226 Pa.Super.585, 323 A.2d 199 ('97*0, a Pennsylvania Superior Court observed:
. . . At the hearing ... there was no evidence
regarding the husband's earning power. Nor was
there evidence to show that the husband had any
assets. For our court to sustain a support order,
there must be sufficient evidence of the husband's
ability to pay. The court below cannot base its
decision on a conjectured ability to pay. 323 A.2d
199 at 200-201.
For another Pennsylvania case whose holding is in accord with Commonwealth
v. Testa, supra, see Commonweal th v. Beckham, 186 Pa.Super.7*+, l*+0 A.2d
kjl

(1958).

In Beckham, the court construed a statute similar to but

with some distinctions from the UCLSA.

The Beckham court held that the

purpose of the Pennsylvania statute was:
. . . to secure a reasonable allowance for the
support of the wife, but only to the extent that
it is consistent with the husband's property,
income and earning capacity. ]k0 A.2d 271 at 472.
The New York case of Rennselaer County Dept. of Social Serv. v.
Cossart, 327 N.Y.S. 2d 117, 38 A.D.2d 635 (1971) is very much like the
instant case.

Appellant father had been directed

by a New York Family

Court to pay $75.00 per week as support for his wife and child, the right
to proceed against the father having been assigned to the county department
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of social services.

The New York Appellate court stated:

. . . The only basis for the award made is the
unsworn statement made by attorneys for the Department of Social Services in the course of colloquy
between the court and counsel that respondent's
[mother's] public assistance budget was $325.00
per month ... it [the unsworn statement] is contrary
to the wife's ... statement that she was receiving
$56.00 per week, $26.00 from the Department of
Social Services and $30.00 from appellant. Accordingly* this proceeding must be remanded to the
Rennselaer County Family Court with direction that
a proper support proceeding be initiated and conducted so as to resolve all the issue here in
dispute. 327 N.Y.S. 2d 117 at 118.
New York, it should be noted does not have the Uniform Civil Liability
for Support Act.

However, the court's reasoning in the Cossart case,

supra, indicates that liability for support must be determined on a
case-by-case basis, relative to the obligee's needs and the obligor's
ability to provide support.
California is one of four states to have enacted the UCLSA,
Cal. Civil Code §§241 et seq.

In Smi th v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals

Board, 53 Cal. Rptr. 8l6 (Cal. App. 1966), the California Appellate Court
was called upon to construe §3501 of the California Labor Code.

Minor

children in their father's custody sought recovery, under California's
Workmen's Compensation Act, for their mother's death.

The mother had been

contributing to the children's support, even though no court had ordered
her to do so.

The California appellate court addressed

itself to the

question of who was supporting the children, at the time of the mother's
death, within the meaning of §3501 of the California Labor Code?
Court held that there must be a presumption under §3501:
which differentiates between the legal duty of the
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The

parent to support the child and the current legal
liability under that duty to support the child.
Although the duty to support is constant, liability
thereunder exists only when the obligee is in need
of support and the obligor is able to support. j>3
Cal. Rptr. 816 at 821-822.
What emerges from the cases discussed thus far is that the;re
is a difference between the unliquidated duty to support and a liquidated
sum certain representing liability for support.
attributable to the myriad possibilities

This difference is

involved

in determining the

relative standard of the obligee's needs and the obligor's ability to
meet those needs.

Respondents submit that the determination of support

liability, how much and how it is determined, is sp]ely a matter of state
law and, as will be seen in the next part of this Brief, that the Uniform
Civil Liability for Support Act was enacted to facilitate application of
the particular state's law of support liability, noc to establish ^ new
standard which ignores the relative needs of obligees and ability of
obligors to support those needs.

POINT I I
UNDER THE UNIFORM CIVIL LIABILITY FOR SUPPORT ACT, SUPPORT
LIABILITY

IS DETERMINED BY THE SUPPORT LAW OF EACH STATE,
Appellants, in their Brief at p . 7 , state that a basic purpose

of the Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act is the establishment of
a statutory duty of support to be used

in conjunction with the Uniform

Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (hereinafter U R E S A ) , which
Act has been adopted by every state except Nevada.
U.C.A. 1953, as amended, for Utah's URESA.

latter

See §§77-6la-l et seq.

This statement that the two
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Acts should be read in conjunction requires close scrutiny.
In the Commissioners 1 Prefatory Note to the UCLSA, Uniform
Laws Annotated, Master Edition, Volume 9, the purpose of the UCLSA is
set forth at p.1J3:
The purpose of this act is to promote and facilitate
the use of the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of
Support Act ... Already the use of the Reciprocal
Enforcement of Support Act to collect family support
money across state lines has substantially lessened
the burden on the public purse of supporting thousands
of destitute families ... the Act [URESA] can operate
most efficiently only when the duties of support are
clearly and definitely stated in each state.
The commissioners go on to observe that there has been confusion among*
the states as to what constitutes the duty of support, some states not
having a statutory duty, some with both common law and statutory duties,
others having conflicting standards.

To facilitate the use of URESA,

the Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act was drafted for the purpose
of creating a definite statutory duty to support in the drafting state.
The Prefatory Note continues:
The Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support
Act provides in section 9 that "all duties of support
are enforceable by action..." and in section 7 that
"Duties of support applicable under this law (act)
are those imposed or imposable under the laws of any
state where the obligor was present during the period
for which support is sought . . .
Under these sections then the recovery by the
destitute obligee is to be measured by the duty of
support set out in the law of the state where the
obiigor is present
...
There is nothing in the Commissioners' Prefatory Notes to either
the UCLSA or the URESA concerning the obligor's 1iabi1ity for support, the
Prefatory Notes to the two acts speak only to an obligor's duty to support.
It is submitted that this omission of a commentary on support liability is
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attributable to a very basic intention to not establish an arbitrary
standard for determining support liability without regard to obligees'
ability to provide, but rather to facilitate enforcement of the right
to receive support once liability for support has been determined and
fixed at a sum certain under the law of the particular state.

The

Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act sets out clearly what constitutes
the duty to support; once this duty is established, liability

thereunder

should be determined at a hearing, using as guidelines the general
criteria of §78-^+5-7 U.C.A.
Legal commentator William Brockelbank agrees with the principle
that support 1iabi1i ty depends on all the relative circumstances of the
obligees and obligors, and that the purpose of UCLSA and URESA is to
facilitate enforcement of liability, not to dictate an arbitrary standard
for support liability determination.

In his treatise Interstate

Inforce-

ment of Family Support, 2nd Edition 1971, Mr. Brockelbank, in discussing
the URESA, refutes two misconceptions, one that the URESA's purpose is to
effect the greatest amount of support liability possible, the other that
the standard of support liability should be uniform throughout the various
states:
Sometimes some of those who are most intimately
involved with the enforcement of [URESA] reason that
since [URESA] was meant to recover more and more relief
money for more and more destitute families, the older
text is to be preferred because it jj^ the most severe
[emphasis original]. This becomes at times a sort of
sadistic cry "let's soak the fleeing pappy." But this
is an unworthy objective. No law should ever "soak"
anybody. The purpose of law is to do even-handed justice.
To take sides in favor of the plaintiff in any controversy
is to throw justice to the winds. The amount of the
judgment he [support obligor] has to pay must take into
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account all the circumstances. One of these is the
fact that, as of rights, he is now living in another
state which may reguire less of him than the state
he left, [Emphas is added]. Brockelbank, supra,
chapter III, p.35.
As mentioned above, it is urged that the Uniform Civil Liability
for Support Act fixes the existence of a duty to support in the enacting
state, but, that once this duty has been established, liability for
support must be ascertained pursuant to the criteria of §78-45-7 U.C.A.
Appellants contend, in their Brief at p.16, that §78-45-7 U.C.A.
"apparently applies only to prospective support."

Respondents submit

that said section applies with egual force to both prospective and
retrospective support liability.

Clearly, liability for support, past

or future, is a matter of individual state law, see Brockelbank, supra,
p.9 of this Brief.

Some states may allow a retrospective support order

after a hearing to determine the amount due; others may bar recovery for
any period during which the duty to support obtained but no hearing to
fix support liability was held.

Respondents believe that, under the law

of Utah, there need not be a prior court order of support for a court to
conduct a hearing to determine liability for support already provided.
The duty to support exists in Utah independant of the UCLSA.

Rees v.

Archibald, 6 Utah 2d 264, 311 P.2d 788 (1957); §30-2-9 U.C.A. 1953, as
amended.

However, under the Utah Uniform Civil Liability for Support

Act, support liability must be determined, whether for future or already
furnished support, pursuant to the mandate of §78-45-7 U.C.A.

To hold

otherwisewould be to attach untoward significance to the UCLSA's onetime use of the word "reimbursement" and to create a situation so illogical that it could not have been the intention of the Utah Legislature
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to do so,

This position is addressed in the next Point of Respondents'

Brief.

POINT III
THE UNIFORM CIVIL LIABILITY FOR SUPPORT ACT WAS ENACTED FOR
THE PURPOSE OF OBTAINING SUPPORT FOR NEEDY OBLIGEES, NOT FOR PROVIDING
THE STATE OF UTAH, ACTING AS A THIRD PARTY, WITH A RIGHT TO REIMBURSEMENT
FOR NECESSARIES FURNISHED.
A hypothetical example will help to illustrate Point III.
Suppose that father is married to mother and that they have a minor child.
After five years of wedded bliss, father and mother separate, with mother
retaining custody of the child.

Father remains within the state, but does

not contribute any support to mother and child.

Upon separation, mother

immediately applies for and receives a grant under the ADC Program,
receiving $200,00 per month from the state.

After three years of the

separation, mother, through the welfare department, brings an action for
support under the UCLSA.

Suppose furthermore that during the entire three

year period before mother brought the UCLSA action, and for three yearsv
after she brought it, the father's ability to contribute support to mother
and child remains the same, and mother continues to receive an ADC grant
in the amount of $200.00 per month.
According to the arguments advanced

in Appellants1 Brief, the

welfare department is entitled to reimbursement of an amount equal to
$200.00 per month for three years (the period during which existed no
court order fixing support liability at a sum certain), but is entitled
to only that amount ordered by the district court under §78-**5~7 U.C.A.
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after the UCLSA hearing, even though the mother continues to receive the
identical ADC grant.

Appellants' interpretation is sound if during the

entire period the father was possessed of sufficient ability to contribute
$200.00 per month as support.

But how can the district court which con-

ducts the UCLSA hearing know for a fact that the father had this ability
to contribute support, unless competent evidence of that ability is
presented to the court?

Using Appellants1

interpretation of the UCLSA,

for the period between separation and the UCLSA hearing, all the state
need do is prove willful failure of the obligor to provide support, and
reimbursement

is measured by that amount which the state furnished.

Appellants' argue that there need not be any determination under §78-45-7
for retrospective support orders, yet contend at p.16 of their Brief,
that the prospective support order entered against the father at the
UCLSA hearing j[s governed by the standard of §78-45-7 U.C.A., which
standard is:
78-^5-7. Determination of amount of support.--When
determining the amount due for support the court shall
consider all relevant factors including but not limited
to:
(1) the standard of living and situation of
the parties;
(2) the relative wealth and income of the
\
parties;
(3) the ability of the obligor to earn,
(4) the abi1ity of the obiigee to earn;
(5) the need of the obligee;
(6) the age of the parties;
(7) the responsibility of the obligor for
the support of others.
One must condude from Appellants1 above-mentioned arguments
that the UCLSA has two purposes:

the first to provide a means, under

§78-45-7 U.C.A., of obtaining prospective support orders against support
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obligors; the second to provide the state with a method of obtaining
reimbursement based not on §78-45-7 U.C.A., but on the amount of support
furnished by the state.

This position

reason for this inconsistency

is not logically consistent.

is that welfare grants are based upon

criteria different from those set out in §78-45-7 U.C.A.
Answers to Defendants 1
the Record on Appeal

One

See Plaintiff's

Interrogatories, Answers 2 ( a ) , 2 ( b ) , contained

in the instant case.

jn

These welfare grants do not

consider the obligor-husband at all, and determination of the amount of
the grant

is made unilaterally,

considered.

i.e., only the obligees' needs are

It may be that a court, under either the UCLSA or as an

incident of a divorce proceeding, would order an obligor to pay an amount
approximately equal to the ADC grant; but that would be a fortuitous
occurrence, since the court would employ different criteria
support liability.

Therefore, support liability, by which

in determining
is meant liqui-

dation of the duty to support to an order against an obligor to pay a sum
certain for support, is determined by criteria different than those used
to determine the amount of. grants furnished to ADC recipients.
supports Respondents 1 position that the measure of reimbursement
be determined under §78-45~7 U.C.A.
the meaning of which

This
is to

And a close look at §78-45-9 U.C.A,

is at issue in this appeal, supports Respondents'

position that the UCLSA deals only and exclusively with the question of
support, not with reimbursement of a third party for necessaries
The UCLSA defines "obligor", "obligee", and state as:
78-45-2. Defini t i o n s . — A s used in this act:
(1) "State" includes any state, territory or
or possession of the United States, the District
of Columbia and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
(2) "Obligor" means any person owing a duty of
support.
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furnished.

(3) "Obi igee" means any person to whom a duty of
support is owed.
Enforcement of the duty of support is governed by:
78-^5"9. Enforcement of right to support - Powers
of the state department of public welfare. - The
obligee may enforce his right of support against
the obligor and the state department of public welfare
may proceed on behalf of the obligee to enforce his
right of support against the obligor. Whenever the
state department of public welfare furnished support
to an obligee, it has the same right as the obligee
to whom the support was furnished, for the purpose of
securing reimbursement and of obtaining continuing
support. [Emphasis added]
In §78-45-9, the word "support" is used five times; the word
"reimbursement" is used once.

Appellants, in their Brief at p.16, state

that, "As to the former [reimbursement] the legislature must have assume^
the commonly accepted meaning of 'reimbursement' was so clear that there
could be no dispute as to it."

Respondents submit, it view of the

absence of legislative history of the meaning of "reimbursement", as
used in §78-45-9 U.C.A., and the obvious intention of the UCLSA to deal
with support, that "reimbursement", as used in §78-45"9 U.C.A., means
reimbursement of support, not reimbursement of necessaries furnished by1
a third party, as will be seen below.
Under §78-45-9 U.C.A., the state department of public welfare's
rights are derivative, i.e., the agency may proceed "on behalf of the
obligee" and has "the same right as the obligee to whom support was
furnished, for the purpose of securing reimbursement and of obtaining
continuing support."

See Memorandum Decisions of Judge Gould, dated

May 7, 1975; Summary Judgments dated May 21, 1975; Plaintiff's Answer
to Request for Admission #3, all in the Record on Appeal of this case.
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The State of Utah, therefore, in a proceeding under the UCLSA, has no
rights greater than or other than those of the obligee to whom the State
is subrogated.

It is urged that these "rights of the obligee" are those

concerning support only, and that the Utah law on obtaining support orders
governs as to what amount, if any, to which the State is entitled.
Respondents contend that the Utah law on determining the amount
of support due from an obligor is governed by those criteria under which
alimony and child support are decreed

in actions for divorce and separate

maintenance, §§30-3"1 et seq. U.C.A. 1953, as amended, and furthermore
submit that these same criteria are embodied

in §78-45-7 U.C.A.

In 27 B,

C.J.S., Divorce §319 (5) it is stated:
The amount of the allowance for the support of the
minor children of divorced parents is generally within
the sound discretion of the court [Bu1ler v. Builen,
71 Utah 63, 262 P.292 (1928); Tsoufakis v. Tsoufakis,
14 Utah 2d 273, 382 P.2d 412 (1963); Bader v. Bader,
18 Utah 2d 407, 424 P.2d 150 (1967)], and all the
circumstances of the particular case should be considered in fixing it [McBroom v. McBroom, 14 Utah 2d
393, 384 P.2d 961 (1963)]; but such discretion is
limited to the conditions and financial ability existing
at the time of the order.
'n

an

Annotation, "Alimony-Retrospective Modification," 6 A.L.R.

2d 1277, §25 st p.1331, it is stated:
Where the court has granted a decree for alimony,
separate maintenance, or support, it is generally held
that the court does not have the power, or ought to
refuse, to modify the decree by making an additional
allowance for expenses incurred in the past.
This A.L.R. position

is supported by the Utah case of Openshaw v.

Openshaw, 144 P.2d 528 (Utah 1943) in which a divorce decree had been
entered previously and the recipient of the decree award sought to have
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the decree modified.

The Utah Supreme Court said:

' n Openshaw v. Openshaw, last cited, we held
that the right of the trial court to modify an alimony
or support money award does not extend to installments
which have already accrued and which are past due,
because the.right to collect such installments becomes
vested upon their due date . . . ]kk P.2d 528 at p.530.
Thus, in the normal course in Utah, child support and alimony
or separate maintenance are determined

in proceedings under §§30-3-1

U.C.A., which embodies basically the same criteria as those set out in
§78-45-7, U.C.A.

Under these criteria, the ability of the obligor to

actually provide support

is always considered.

Should the obligor be

denied a chance to be heard as to his ability to provide support simply
becase the obligee and the State elect to bring an action under the
UCLSA and claim a right to reimbursement of an amount not previously
decreed?
read

To read §78-^5-9 U.C.A. as Appellants suggest

it should be

is to bypass the long established criteria and procedures for

determining support
Appellants

in favor of procedures not heretofore

tested.

in their Brief cite cases from other jurisdictions

in which an order of reimbursement was entered based on the amount pro- 1
vided by the State and in which no prior order of support had been entered.
The cases are Los Angeles County v. Frisbie, 19 Cal. 2d 63^, 122 P.2d 526
(19^2), cited at p.8 of Appellants' Brief; and Langevin v. Hi 1Isborc ugh
County, 320 A.2d 635 (N.H. 197*0.

Respondents feel that these cases are

d ist ingu ishable.
'n

the Frisbie case, supra, the support statute in question

was not the UCLSA, which California had not then enacted, but another
statute which was quite different from the UCLSA.

The California statute
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to which Appellants refer was §2576 of the California Welfare and institutions Code, St. 1937.

Unlike §78-45"9 U.C.A. , the California

statute

spec ifical1y stated:
. . . Upon failure of such [responsible] kindred to
support the indigent, the county may extend aid, and
such kindred in the order above named and to the extent
of thei r abi1i ty shall reimburse the county for the
support of the indigent
...
The board of supervisors shall, in the case of
aid granted by institutional care, fix a reasonable
charge therefor, which shall be the measure of reimbursement to the county, and the existence of the order
fixing the charge shall constitute prima facie evidence
of its reasonableness.
The Frisbie case, therefore, actually supports Respondents' position,
since the statute involved took into account the obligors ability to
pay.

Furthermore, the statute clearly and unequivocally states that

the obligor shall reimburse the county, a far cry from §78-45-9'$ conferring of a right to seek reimbursement.
Respondents will dispose of Appellants' citation to the
Langevin case, supra, by mentioning the key distinction.

Appellants'

statement that the New Hampshire statute there in question was similar
to the Utah UCLSA is somewhat misleading, since New Hampshire had, at
the time the Langevin case was litigated, adopted the UCLSA.

The

Langevin case was, therefore, decided under a different statute, New
Hampshire RSA 169:11 and 166:20, which statutes gave the town a specific
right of action in its own right against the obligor, and not a subrogated
right, as does §78-45-9 U.C.A.

The Langevin case is, therefore, inapposite.

Further credence is given to Respondents' position that the UCLSA,
§78-^5-9 U.C.A.

is not intended to give the State of Utah an

right to reimbursement, by resort to the law of restitution.
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independent
In the

Restatement of the Law Of Restitution - Quasi Contracts and Constructive
Trusts, Chapter 5 - Benefits Voluntarily Conferred, §113, p.^+64 (American
Law Institute 1937), it is stated:
PERFORMANCE OF ANOTHERS NONCONTRACTUAL DUTY TO
SUPPLY NECESSARIES TO A THIRD PERSON.
A person who has performed the noncontractual
duty of another by supplying a third person with
necessaries which in violation of such duty the
other had failed to supply, although acting without
the other's knowledge or consent, is entitled to
restitution therefor from the other if he acted
unofficiously and with intent to charge therefor.
This would appear to be the basis for Appellants' citation of Baggs v.
Anderson,

Utah

, 538 P.2d

141 (197*0, at p.13 of their Brief.

' n Baggs v. Anderson, Justice Henriod, in his dissent, sounded
a warning:
that the hallmark of the main opinion considerably
is based on the gratuity that if anybody, -just anybody, -pays a decreed amount for X, beneficiary of a
judgment, -has some kind of an immutable right to
collect from the judgment debtor
...
Such a concept allows an interloper, not particeps to a debts, and not a litigant ... to muscle
in on a contract or debt or judgment and collect on
a voluntary payment of someone else's obligation, when the latter may be subject to a legal defense ...
528 P.2d 141 at 145.
Justice Henriod apparently was concerned that the doctrine of reimbursing
third parties, as set out in the Restatement of Restitution, supra, was
being stretched to cover situations for which its use was never

intended.

Justice Henriod's warning has applicability to the instant
case.

The Utah State Department of Social Services was already under

its own duty to provide support for the named female plaintiffs before
the instant proceedings were brought.

§§55-15a-1 et seq. U.C.A. 1953,

as amended, are the Public Assistance Act of Utah, one portion of which
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is the ADC Program.

The relevant sections of said Act are:

55-15a-1. Purpose of act. -"Person in need" defined,
-It is the purpose of this act to provide assistance
to any person in Utah in need. A person is in need
and entitled to assistance if sufficient resources are
not available for his use within the limitations set
forth herein and who otherwise qualifies.
55-15a~17.
. . .
Assistance shall be be provided under this act
for individuals who qualify as follows:
•

•

•

(3) Persons in need, that
...
(a) are children under the age of 21 . . . and
who have been deprived of natural or step-parent
support or care, and
(b) are natural or step-parents or relatives
who have the custody and control of such needy children.
[By 1975 amendment, this section is now §55-15a-17
(3) (a), (b)]
55-15a-24. ... Assignment of alimony or support payments ...
...
The office [of Assistance Payments] is authorized
to accept an assignment of court ordered alimony or
child support from any recipient of assistance. An
assignment of alimony or support shall include payments
ordered, decreed, or adjudged by an court within the
State of Utah or any other state or territory of the
United States and is not in lieu of or to supersede
or alter any other court order, decree or judgment.
No assignment may be used as a requirement to establish
eligibility for assistance ...
The State of Utah, being already under an affirmative duty to provide
assistance to "persons in need", cannot be deemed to be acting "unofficiously and with intent to charge therefor" within the meaning of
the Restatement of Restitution, supra.

Moreover, the right to reim-

bursement conferred by §78-*+5-9 U.C.A. on the State is the right the
obligee has, not the right of a third party.

The obligees in the

instant case did not furnish the support; therefore the State has no
independent third party right to reimbursement.
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CONCLUSION
Respondents feel that adoption of the views they express herein
will not harm the citizenry of Utah.

Respondents do not contend that

because there was no prior order of support, that they have been relieved
of either their duty to provide it or their potential liability.

Rather,

they ask only that the Supreme Court of Utah declare that in proceedings
under the UCLSA, §78-45-9 U.C.A., for both prospective and retrospective
support orders, a hearing must first be had under §78-45-7 U.C.A. so
that the proper amount of liability can be fixed.
It is clear that the trial court was correct in ordering
summary judgment.

Appellants have, in their Brief, misconstrued Judge

Gould's decision to the extent that they interpret his holding that "the
[welfare] agency cannot obtain a judgment for a sum certain without first
obtaining an order for monthly support" to mean that because they had
not obtained such a prior order, they are forever barred from obtaining
reimbursement.

Judge Gould's decisions can and should be read to mean

that the State can seek reimbursement; but that in order to obtain
judgment for a sum certain as reimbursement, the State must first
establish the amount to which it is entitled at a hearing pursuant to
the Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act, §78-45-7 U.C.A. 1953, as
amended.

Affirmance of the lower court will relieve the taxpayers of a

burden; it will not impose a greater one.
Respectfully submitted,
MARTIN W. CUSTEN
Attorney for Respondents
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